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How does uncertainty about other voters determine a
strategic vote?
Zeinab Bakhtiari∗ Hans van Ditmarsch† Abdallah Saffidine‡
Abstract
We propose a framework for strategic voting when a voter may lack knowledge
about the preferences of other voters, or about other voters’ knowledge about her
own preference. In this setting we define notions of manipulation, equilibrium, and
dominance, under uncertainty. We provide scenarios wherein the profiles of true
preferences are the same but the equilibrium profiles are different, because the voters
have different knowledge about other voters. We also model actions that change such
uncertainty about preferences, such as a voter revealing her preference. We show that
some forms of manipulation and equilibrium are preserved under such uncertainty
updates and others not. We then formalize epistemic voting terminology in a logic.
Our aim is to provide the epistemic background for the analysis and design of voting
rules that incorporate uncertainty.
keywords social choice, voting, epistemic logic, dynamics
1 Introduction
A well-known fact in social choice theory is that strategic voting, also known as manipula-
tion, becomes harder when voters know less about the preferences of other voters. Standard
approaches to manipulation in social choice theory (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975) as
well as in computational social choice (Bartholdi et al., 1989) assume that the manipulating
voter knows the sincere preferences of other voters. Some approaches (Duggan and Schwartz,
2000; Barbera` et al., 1998) assume that voters have a probabilistic prior belief on the out-
come of the vote, which encompasses the case where each voter has a probability distribu-
tion over the set of profiles. In yet other approaches the uncertainty of the manipulator
is modelled as the inability to distinguish between a set of voting profiles (Conitzer et al.,
2011; Meir, 2015). In Conitzer et al. (2011) manipulators have incomplete knowledge of
the non-manipulators’ preferences. Meir (2015) is a setting for iterated voting, wherein
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incomplete knowledge of the profile at the next iteration is induced by the partial view
on the profile at the current iteration. Still, we think that the study of strategic voting
under complex belief states has received little attention so far, especially when voters are
uncertain about the uncertainties of other voters, i.e., when we model higher-order beliefs
of voters.
In this contribution we present a logic to model higher-order uncertainty of voters. On
the assumption that voters may be uncertain about other voters’ preferences but know
their own preference, we model how this uncertainty may determine a strategic vote, and
how a reduction in this uncertainty may change a strategic vote. We give scenarios where
the profile is the same, and even the set of profiles about which the manipulator is uncertain
is the same, but where the uncertainty about other voters is different, thus resulting in
different manipulations. Additionally, reducing such uncertainty may affect manipulative
behaviour, and we also give example scenarios for that. We model uncertainty reducing
actions as truthful public announcements (Plaza, 1989).
There are several ways of expressing incomplete knowledge about the linear order of
preference of a voter. The literature on possible and necessary winners assumes that it is
expressed by a collection of partial strict orders (one for each voter), while Hazon et al.
(2008) consider it to consist of a collection of probability distributions, or a collection of sets
of linear orders (one for each voter), i.e., a collection of profiles. For partial preference see
also Konczak and Lang (2005) and more generally for voting under incomplete knowledge
see Boutilier and Rosenschein (2016).
A first link between epistemic logic and voting, to our knowledge, has been given in
Chopra et al. (2004)—they use knowledge graphs to indicate that a voter is uncertain
about the preferences of another voter. A more recent follow-up of that, within the area
known as social software, is Parikh et al. (2013).
An independent line of modal logics for social choice, of which voting can be seen
as a special case, was proposed in A˚gotnes et al. (2006) and in the journal follow-up
A˚gotnes et al. (2011). They consider two modalities of which one formalizes what is true
for all profiles (in the current agenda). It is clearly similar to our epistemic modality for-
malizing uncertainty about (voting) profiles. The quantification in A˚gotnes et al. (2011)
is game theoretical rather than epistemic as in Chopra et al. (2004) and in our proposal.
Modal logics of social choice and of voting have further been proposed in Troquard et al.
(2011) and, building on that, in Cina´ and Endriss (2016); Perkov (2016). Also in these
logics the semantic primitives are preferences of agents or voters, and sets of those, i.e.,
profiles. But the modalities encode agency, and not uncertainty, as we do. Compared to
their results the logical equivalents of our voting primitives are very ‘flat’: essentially we
encode them as big disjunctions of profiles, for example, we represent the proposition that
a is the winner of the election by the (very large) disjunction of all profiles wherein this
is the case, given that the voting function F is a parameter of the logic (and not of the
model, as in Cina´ and Endriss (2016)). In our case, all the logical action goes into the
uncertainty about profiles, and the modelling results involve the formalization of epistemic
notions such as conditional (i.e., Bayesian) equilibrium, and their (epistemic) updates.
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The uncertainty of a manipulating voter in the mentioned Conitzer et al. (2011) and
Meir (2015) is modelled in information sets (i.e., set of indistinguishable profiles). How-
ever, from that voter’s perspective the other voters are not uncertain, so that higher-order
uncertainty is not considered. The goals of Meir (2015) are similar to ours (when do equi-
libria exist, assume risk aversion) but his methods are statistical (there is no higher-order
uncertainty).
Our setting shares also some similarity with robust mechanism design (Bergemann and Morris,
2005), which generalizes classical mechanism design by weakening the common knowledge
assumptions of the environment among the players and the planner. In Bergemann and Morris
(2005) uncertainty is modelled with information partitions. The main technical difference
is that in our setting, as in classical social choice theory, preferences are ordinal, whereas in
(robust) mechanism design preferences are numerical payoffs, which allows for payments.
This is an overview of our contribution. Section 2 presents voting terminology. Section
3 introduces knowledge profiles, our semantic primitive. Section 4 investigates epistemic
notions of dominance. Section 5 defines equilibrium profiles under uncertainty, wherein
voting is represented as a Bayesian game. Section 6 is devoted to uncertainty updates and
how this affects knowledge of other voters and equilibrium profiles. Then, in Section 7 we
succinctly present the logic of this contribution more formally — we do this at the end,
because our main focus is the semantic interaction of knowledge and voting, not the logic.
2 Voting
Assume a finite set N = {1, . . . , n} of n voters (or agents), and a finite set C = {a, b, c, . . . }
of m candidates (or alternatives). Voter variables are i, j, . . . , and candidate variables are
x, y, (x1, x2, ).... Let O(C) be the set of linear orders on C.
Definition 1 (Preference, profile, voting rule, vote) For each voter i, a preference
(relation) (over C) is a linear order on C. A profile ≻ is a function ≻: N → O(C)
assigning a preference ≻(i), denoted as ≻i, to each voter. A (resolute) voting rule is a
function F : O(C)N → C from the set of profiles for N to the set of candidates. From the
perspective of the voting rule the enacted preference ≻i is a vote.
If voter i prefers candidate a to candidate b in preference ≻i, we write a ≻i b, or b ≺i a.
For (a = b or a ≻i b) we write a i b, or b i a. Profile variables are ≻,≻′,≻′′, .... If
≻ ∈ O(C)N and ≻′i ∈ O(C), then (≻−i,≻
′
i) is the profile wherein ≻i is substituted by ≻
′
i
in ≻.
The voting rule determines which candidate wins the election — F (≻) is the winner.
In case there is more than one tied co-winner we assume a tie-breaking preference, that
is a linear order over candidates. In the plurality voting rule the winner is the candidate
who is most often ranked the top candidate (most preferred in ≻i), where in case there are
several co-winners the tie-breaking preference selects one.
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Voters cannot be assumed to vote according to their preference. Instead of giving her
sincere or truthful preference, a voter may cast another preference as her vote. This is an
insincere or strategic preference. If that vote improves the outcome it is a manipulation.
Definition 2 (Manipulation) Let i ∈ N , ≻ ∈ O(C)N , ≻′i ∈ O(C), and F a voting rule.
If F (≻−i,≻′i) ≻i F (≻), then ≻
′
i is a manipulation by voter i of profile ≻.
The combination of a profile ≻ and a voting rule F defines a strategic game: a player
is a voter, an individual strategy for a player is a preference, a strategy profile (of players)
is therefore a profile in our defined sense (of voters), and the preference of a player among
the outcomes is according to her sincere vote: given profiles ≻′, ≻′′, voter i also prefers
outcome F (≻′) over outcome F (≻′′) in the game theoretical sense iff (in the voting sense)
F (≻′) ≻i F (≻
′′). The relevant notions of dominance and equilibrium are as follows.
Definition 3 (Dominant preference) Let i ∈ N , ≻ ∈ O(C)N , ≻′i ∈ O(C), and F a
voting rule. If for all ≻′′ ∈ O(C)N , F (≻′′−i,≻
′
i) i F (≻
′′), and for some ≻′′ ∈ O(C)N ,
F (≻′′−i,≻
′
i) ≻i F (≻
′′), then ≻′i is a dominant preference for voter i.
A dominant preference corresponds to a dominant strategy in game theory.1 The reader
will recognize this as weak dominance. We may also use strong dominance, which holds for
≻′i if for all ≻
′′ ∈ O(C)N , F (≻′′−i,≻
′
i) ≻i F (≻
′′). Note that a dominant preference need not
be a manipulation of ≻: the strict part may be satisfied for another profile than the profile
≻ of true preferences. (Of course, a strongly dominant strategy is also a manipulation.)
Definition 4 (Equilibrium profile) A profile ≻ is an equilibrium profile iff no voter
has a manipulation of ≻.
An equilibrium profile corresponds to a Nash equilibrium (in game theory). An equivalent
way of defining equilibrium profile is: A profile ≻ is an equilibrium profile iff for all ≻′i ∈
O(C), F (≻) i F (≻−i,≻′i). The formulations correspond:
Suppose the above condition does not hold. Then there is a voter i and some pref-
erence ≻′i ∈ O(C) such that F (≻) ≺i F (≻−i,≻
′
i), i.e., F (≻−i,≻
′
i) ≻i F (≻), i.e., ≻
′
i is a
manipulation for voter i of profile ≻. In other words, if the condition holds, then no voter
has a manipulation of ≻.
3 Knowledge profiles
We model uncertainty in voting as incomplete knowledge about the profile. The structures
to represent such uncertainty are standard in modal logic (Fagin et al., 1995; van Ditmarsch et al.,
2008). To allow for the definition of dominance and of equilibria under uncertainty, we
require that voters know their own preference.
1We called this (game theoretical) notion ‘dominant preference’ and not ‘dominant manipulation’, to
avoid confusion with the (epistemic) notion of dominant manipulation of an information set, defined in
Subsection 4.2: only the latter is commonly used in voting theory, as the requirements of the former are
very strong.
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Definition 5 (Knowledge profile) A profile model is a structure M = (S,∼, pi), where
S is a domain of abstract objects called states; where ∼ : N → P(S × S) is a function
such that for i = 1, . . . , n, (∼(i) written as) ∼i is an indistinguishability relation that is
an equivalence relation; and where valuation pi : S → O(C)N assigns a profile to each state
and such that s ∼i t implies pi(s)i = pi(t)i. The information set of voter i in state s is
defined as [s]∼i := {t | s ∼i t}. Let pi([s]∼i) denote {pi(t) | s ∼i t}. A knowledge profile is
pointed structure Ms where s ∈ S.
Unless confusion results, the set pi([s]∼i) of profiles that i considers possible is also called
an information set, as in the voting literature (Conitzer et al., 2011). In general, different
information sets (i.e., sets of states) may be about the same set of profiles.
Definition 6 (Knowledge and ignorance) Given is a knowledge profileMs, whereM =
(S,∼, pi). Let ϕ be a proposition about profiles. Voter i knows ϕ in Ms, iff ϕ is true in
all t ∈ S such that s ∼i t. Voter i considers possible that (or does not know that not) ϕ
in Ms, iff ϕ is true in some t ∈ S such that s ∼i t; if, in that case, there is an additional
state u ∈ S with s ∼i u in which ϕ is false, then we say that i does not know whether (or
is uncertain about, or is ignorant about) ϕ.
Section 7 contains a proper inductive definition of ‘proposition about profiles’, and a formal
semantics. For now it suffices to say that the following are propositions about profiles: ≻ or
‘the profile is ≻’; a ≻i b, and ≻i (‘the preference of voter i is ≻i’); and also propositions like
‘voter i knows that voter j knows ≻i’. Example 7 demonstrates that: different states may
be assigned the same profile, but have different knowledge properties. In scenarios where
different states are always assigned different profiles, we can say that the uncertainty of
a voter is (only) about a collection of profiles. But in scenarios where different states
are assigned the same profile, the set pi([s]∼i) of profiles that voter i considers possible is
smaller than the set [s]∼i of states that i considers possible.
Partial preferences cannot be expressed in our framework. In particular, uncertainty
between a ≻i b ≻i c and b ≻i a ≻i c does not mean indifference between candidates a and
b. Uncertainty between a ≻i b ≻i c and b ≻i a ≻i c means that (a ≻i b ≻i c or b ≻i a ≻i c)
is true. This entails (a ≻i b or b ≻i a), which is equivalent to (not (b i a and a i b)).
That is the opposite of indifference between a and b, as that means (b i a and a i b).
Example 7 Consider two voters who are Leela (1) and Sunil (2), children of Devi, and
who ‘vote’ for an animated movie to see before bedtime; where the choice is between a (Alice
in Wonderland), b (Brave), and c (Cars). Leela’s preference is a ≻1 b ≻1 c and Sunil’s
preference is c ≻2 b ≻2 a. Sunil (2) is uncertain if Alice is Leela’s most or least preferred
movie, and dually if Cars is Leela’s least or most preferred movie. More interestingly, Leela
(1) knows Sunil’s preference, but she is uncertain whether Sunil knows her preference. Even
more interestingly, Sunil is also uncertain whether, in case Alice is Leela’s most preferred
movie, she knows that he does not know that.
We model this as a knowledge profile Mt consisting of three states s, t, u and for two
voters 1 and 2. State s is assigned to profile ≻, wherein a ≻1 b ≻1 c and c ≻2 b ≻2 a, etc.
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Below, a column represents a preference relation, and states that are indistinguishable for
a voter i are linked with an i-labelled edge. The partition for 1 on the domain is therefore
{{s, t}, {u}}, and the partition for 2 on the domain is {{s}, {t, u}}.
1 2
a c
b b
c a
——1——
1 2
a c
b b
c a
——2——
1 2
c c
b b
a a
s,≻ t,≻ u,≻′
States s and t have been assigned the same profile ≻ but have different epistemic prop-
erties. In s, 2 knows that 1 prefers a over c, whereas in t, 2 does not know that. We list
some relevant propositions that are true in the actual state t:
• Leela prefers Alice over Cars. This is true, because a ≻1 c in t.
• Sunil does not know that Leela prefers Alice over Cars. This is true, because t ∼2 u,
and a ≻1 c is false in u.
• Leela knows Sunil’s preference, but she is uncertain whether Sunil knows her prefer-
ence. In s, Sunil knows that Leela’s preference is a ≻1 b ≻1 c, whereas in t, Sunil
does not know that Leela’s preference is a ≻1 b ≻1 c, because t ∼2 u, and c ≻1 b ≻1 a
in u.
Unlike merely sincere and insincere preference, in knowledge profiles there are three
kinds of preference: actual sincere preference, possible sincere preference, and insincere
preference. InMt of Example 7, Leela’s actual sincere preference is a ≻1 b ≻1 c, a possible
sincere preference is c ≻1 b ≻1 a (namely in state u, from the perspective of Sunil), and an
insincere preference is b ≻1 a ≻1 c. This can be confusing.
4 Manipulation, knowledge and dominance
4.1 Manipulation and knowledge
Given are a knowledge profileMs where pi(s) = ≻, and a voting rule F . If voter i can ma-
nipulate ≻, then voter i can also manipulate Ms. This is because manipulation is defined
with respect to the profile of the actual state of the knowledge profile (it is a game theoret-
ical notion, not an epistemic notion). So it may be that a voter can manipulate the vote
but does not know that, because she considers another profile possible wherein she can-
not manipulate the vote. Notions of manipulation that involve knowledge can be borrowed
from the knowledge and action literature (van Benthem, 2001; Jamroga and van der Hoek,
2004). A curious situation is when in all states that the voter considers possible there is
a manipulation, but when in different such states there are different manipulations. So
she knows that she has a manipulation, but she does not know what the manipulation is.
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This is called de dicto knowledge of manipulation. A stronger form of knowledge is when
there is a preference ≻′i that is the same manipulation in any state that the voter considers
possible. This is called de re knowledge of manipulation.
Definition 8 (Knowledge of manipulation) Given are a knowledge profile Ms and a
voting rule F .
• Voter i knows de dicto that she can manipulate Ms, if for all profiles ≻ ∈ pi([s]∼i)
there is a preference ≻′i such that ≻
′
i is a manipulation in ≻.
• Voter i knows de re that she can manipulateMs, if there is a preference ≻
′
i such that
for all profiles ≻ ∈ pi([s]∼i), ≻
′
i is a manipulation in ≻.
If voter i knows de re that she can manipulate the election, she has the ability to manipu-
late, namely by strategically voting ≻′i. But in de dicto manipulations the voter does not
seem to have that ability. It is akin to ‘game of chicken’ type equilibria in game theory,
wherein for each strategy of a player there is a complementary strategy of the other player
such that the pair is an equilibrium, but where this choice cannot be made without coor-
dination. An example of de dicto knowledge of manipulation for Borda voting is given in
van Ditmarsch et al. (2013).
Consider the profile model H consisting of the domain O(C)N , so we can identify states
s with their profiles ≻ = pi(s), and such that all voters only know their own preferences:
≻ ∼i ≻′ iff ≻i = ≻′i. In this (unique) model it is common knowledge that voters only know
their own preferences. We can see it as an interpreted system (Fagin et al., 1995) consisting
of global states that are profiles and where local states are individual preferences. A model
such as H is known as a hypercube (Lomuscio, 1999).
Proposition 9 In the hypercube profile model, knowledge of manipulation is impossible
for plurality voting.
Proof The result holds for de re knowledge of manipulation and for de dicto knowledge
of manipulation. We start with the de re case.
Let ≻ be the profile. Let us assume that there are a sufficient number of voters and
candidates to avoid boundary cases. Assume towards a contradiction that voter i knows
that ≻′i is a manipulation. As i is uncertain about the preferences of other voters, she
considers it possible all other voters j have the same preferences as herself, i.e., she considers
it possible that the profile is ≻′′ ∈ O(C)N such that for all j ∈ N , ≻′′j = ≻i. In that case,
i’s preferred candidate would have won by majority vote, contradicting the assumption
that ≻′i is a manipulation.
In the de dicto case, for each profile that voter i considers possible there is a manipu-
lation. For all those profiles, assuming that all other voters j have the same preference as
i, again derives a contradiction. 
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4.2 Dominant manipulation and knowledge
We now compare the notions of manipulation and dominant strategy with the notion of
dominant manipulation of an information set in voting theory (Conitzer et al., 2011).
Definition 10 (Dominant manipulation of an information set) Let a knowledge pro-
file Ms with pi(s) = ≻, i ∈ N , ≻
′
i ∈ O(C), and a voting rule F be given. If for all
≻′′ ∈ pi([s]∼i), F (≻
′′
−i,≻
′
i) i F (≻
′′), and for some ≻′′ ∈ pi([s]∼i), F (≻
′′
−i,≻
′
i) ≻i F (≻
′′),
then ≻′i is a dominant manipulation for voter i of information set pi([s]∼i) (or: of knowledge
profile Ms).
Observe that dominant manipulation of an information set according to Conitzer et al.
(2011) is on the assumption that all other voters vote according to their true preference,
whereas dominant preference in the game theoretical sense (Def. 3) is on the assumption
that all other voters can choose any preference as their vote. The first is dominance no
matter the true preference of others (but assuming that this is their vote), the second is
dominance no matter the vote of others (but assuming what their true preferences are).
We consider this difference curious. However, despite such seemingly orthogonal epistemic
and game-theoretical dimensions, they are after all very much related, as now shown in
the following proposition. We therefore find the observations made in this proposition,
although elementary, somewhat surprising.
Proposition 11
1. A dominant manipulation of a singleton set {≻} is a manipulation of ≻ (Def. 2).
2. A dominant manipulation of the hypercube knowledge profile Hs is a dominant pref-
erence given profile pi(s) (Def. 3).
3. If a voter has a dominant manipulation then she knows that she has a dominant
manipulation.
4. If a voter has a dominant manipulation then she may not have a manipulation.
5. Knowledge of dominant manipulation does not imply knowledge of manipulation (nei-
ther de re nor de dicto) (Def. 8).
6. If a voter has de re knowledge of manipulation then she has a dominant manipulation.
Proof
1. The strictness requirement of dominance must apply to ≻.
2. See the curious observation above. We recall that the notion of dominant manipu-
lation models uncertainty over the true preferences of others (the ‘epistemic dimen-
sion’), whereas the notion of dominant preference models uncertainty over how others
vote (the ‘game-theoretical dimension’). That the two coincide is a result.
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3. The notion is defined with respect to an information set.
4. The strictness requirement of dominant manipulation might apply to another than
the actual profile.
5. The strictness requirement of dominant manipulation need not apply to all profiles
in the information set, as in knowledge of manipulation (both de re and de dicto).
6. Strictness holds for all profiles in the information set, and therefore for some.

Given Proposition 11.2, Proposition 9 stating that knowledge of manipulation is impossible
in the hypercube, for majority voting, should therefore be credited to Conitzer et al. (2011)
who proves that dominant manipulation is impossible under common ignorance of others’
preferences, for a variety of voting rules (their results were subsequently strengthened
in Reijngoud and Endriss (2012)). Proposition 11.2 is somewhat surprising: it says that
whether a preference is dominant does not depend on what you know of other voters’
preferences. It holds given common knowledge of the profile iff it holds given common
ignorance (except one’s own preference) of the profile. Dominant strategy as in Def. 3
seems too strong to be useful in voting theory, as it does not even rule out that everybody
except you acts against their interests.
In view of Proposition 11.6, an alternative designation for a (de re) known manipulation
is strongly dominant manipulation.
5 Equilibrium and knowledge
5.1 Conditional equilibrium
Determining equilibria under incomplete knowledge comes down to decision taking under
incomplete knowledge. Therefore we have to choose a decision criterion. Expected utility
makes no sense here, because we didn’t start with probabilities over profiles in the first
place, nor with utilities. In the absence of prior probabilities, the following three criteria
make sense. (i) The insufficient reason (or Laplace) criterion considers all possible states in
a given situation as equiprobable. This criterion was used in A˚gotnes and van Ditmarsch
(2011) to determine equilibria of certain (Bayesian) games of imperfect information. (ii)
The minimax regret criterion selects the decision minimizing the maximum utility loss,
taken over all possible states, compared to the best decision, had the voter known the true
state. (iii) The pessimistic (orWald, or maximin) criterion compares decisions according to
their worst possible consequences. The latter criterion, that we also call risk averse, is one
that fits well our probability-free and utility-free model; this was also the criterion chosen
in Conitzer et al. (2011); Meir (2015). The only assumption here is that the probability
distribution is positive in all states. We now fix this criterion for the rest of the paper.
Pessimistic, optimistic, and other criteria only assuming positive probability are applied to
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social choice settings in Parikh et al. (2013). Meir (2015) also considers the minimax-regret
criterion.
In the presence of knowledge, and on the assumption that voters know their own pref-
erence (so that, in game theoretical terms, the payoff function is uniform throughout an
agent’s information set), the definition of an equilibrium extends naturally. For each agent,
the combination of an agent i and an information set [s]∼i for that agent (for some state
s in the knowledge profile) defines a so-called virtual agent: we model these imperfect
information games as Bayesian games (Harsanyi, 1968). Each virtual agent has the same
set of strategies as the ‘original’ agent. An equilibrium is then a profile of strategies such
that none of the virtual agents has an interest to deviate. An alternative way to present
a Bayesian game, applied in A˚gotnes and van Ditmarsch (2011), is to change the set of
strategies instead of the set of agents. Instead of each agent in each information set (a
‘virtual agent’) choosing a strategy among the set of strategies, we have each agent choos-
ing a conditional strategy among the larger set of conditional strategies, where conditions
correspond to the information sets. We also follow that presentation for voting.
For risk-averse voters knowing their own preferences we can effectively determine if a
conditional profile is an equilibrium without taking probability distributions into account,
unlike in the more general setting of Bayesian games that it originates with.
For any C′ ⊆ C, mini C′ is the (unique) c ∈ C′ such that c′ i c for all c′ ∈ C′.
Let P be a set of profiles, ≻′i ∈ O(C), and F a voting rule, then mini F (P) denotes
mini{F (≻) | ≻ ∈ P}, and mini F (P−i,≻′i) denotes mini {F (≻−i,≻
′
i) | ≻ ∈ P}.
Definition 12 (Pessimistic manipulation) Given is a profile model M = (S,∼, pi),
s ∈ S with pi(s) = ≻, and voting rule F . The worst outcome for voter i in information set
pi([s]∼i) is mini F (pi([s]∼i)). Preference ≻
′
i ∈ O(C) is a pessimistic manipulation for voter
i of pi([s]∼i) (or: of knowledge profile Ms) iff
mini F (pi([s]∼i)−i,≻
′
i) ≻i mini F (pi([s]∼i)).
Definition 13 (Conditional preference, conditional profile, conditional equilibrium)
Given is a profile model M = (S,∼, pi) and voting rule F . For each voter i, a conditional
preference is a function [≻]i : S/∼i → O(C) that assigns a preference to each information
set for that voter. A conditional profile is a function from voters to conditional prefer-
ences. A conditional profile is a conditional equilibrium iff no agent has a pessimistic
manipulation of any of its information sets.2
In the situation without uncertainty, given n voters, a profile and a voting rule determine
a winner. In the strategic game matrix, the outcome is the n-tuple of values (payoffs) of
that winner for each voter, and to determine if it is an equilibrium we compare the value
for any voter i with the value when i had voted differently: the value should not be higher.
2If all states are considered equiprobable (the Laplace criterion), a sufficient (but not necessary) condi-
tion for a conditional profile to be a conditional equilibrium is that no agent has a dominant manipulation
of any of its information sets. We have not investigated this further.
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The outcome of a conditional profile is not an n-tuple of values, but an n-tuple of m-
tuples or vectors (x1i , . . . , x
m
i ), where voter i has m information sets and where x
1
i , . . . , x
m
i
are expected outcomes. These vectors are unordered, so we have to compute equilibria
differently. For example, given a voter 7 with two information sets x and y, we cannot
say which of payoffs (0, 1) and (1, 0) she prefers. But we can say that virtual voter (7, x)
prefers the second (wherein she gets 1) over the first (wherein she gets 0), and that virtual
voter (7, y) prefers the first over the second. This merely is the Bayesian game calculation
of equilibrium for virtual agents.
A notable fact, that we consider a main result of our contribution, is that:
Proposition 14 States with the same profile can have different conditional equilibria.
Proof We prove this by example, in the next subsection. The reader may wish to verify
in Figure 3 in that subsection: that Sunil (2) has the same preference in state u as in state
v, that voting for Cars (c) is not in a conditional equilibrium in u, whereas voting for Cars
is in a conditional equilibrium in v. 
In other words, Proposition 14 states that even if all voters have the same preferences, then
when their knowledge about others’ preferences is different, their manipulative behaviour
may also be different. Readers who find this result obvious may wish to skip the next
subsection and proceed with Section 6 on revealing voting preferences.
5.2 Examples of conditional equilibria in plurality voting
We recall Example 7 about Leela (1) and Sunil (2) voting, by plurality, for an animated
movie that may be a (Alice), b (Brave), or c (Cars), where Leela’s preference is a ≻1 b ≻1 c
and Sunil’s preference is c ≻2 b ≻2 a. We further assume that mother Devi, the central
authority, has tie-breaking preference b ≻tie a ≻tie c. We present equilibria when there is:
no uncertainty, uncertainty between two states with different profiles, and different kinds
of uncertainty between three states (for two profiles).
No uncertainty We express the payoffs for both voters by their ranking (0, 1, or 2) for
the winner. As this is majority voting, preference relations with the same most preferred
candidate are indistinguishable. So, ‘Leela votes a ≻1 b ≻1 c’ and ‘Leela votes a ≻1 c ≻1 b’
can both be represented by ‘Leela votes a’. (Given this identification, we call a a vote and
not a preference (relation).) This simplifies the outcomes matrix and the payoff matrix. If 1
votes for her preference a and 2 votes for his preference c, then the tie-breaking preferences
determines a as the winner, 2’s least preferred candidate. A strategic vote of 2 for candidate
b makes b win, a better outcome for voter 2. Equilibrium pairs of votes are (a, b) and (b, b).
For voter 1, voting a is dominant.
The other profile used in the examples in this section is where 1 shares the preferences
of 2. This is the profile ≻′. Although (c, c) is an equilibrium vote for ≻′, there are various
suboptimal equilibria. There is no dominant vote. An overview of the equilibria for ≻ and
for ≻′ is in Figure 1.
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1 2
a c
b b
c a
1 2
c c
b b
a a
1\2 a b c
a a b a
b b b b
c a b c
1\2 a b c
a 2.0 1.1 2.0
b 1.1 1.1 1.1
c 2.0 1.1 0.2
1\2 a b c
a 0.0 1.1 0.0
b 1.1 1.1 1.1
c 0.0 1.1 2.2
≻ ≻′
Figure 1: Equilibria for ≻ and for ≻′. From left to right: profile ≻, profile ≻′, the matrix
with winners, the outcome matrix for profile ≻, and the outcome matrix for profile ≻′.
Equilibria are boxed. We write i.j instead of (i, j) to denote the values for voters 1 and 2
of the outcome of the election.
Uncertainty between two profiles Now consider the profile model consisting of two
states t with profile ≻ and u with profile ≻′ and that are the same for voter 2, but different
for voter 1 (the accessibility relation for voter 1 is the identity on the model and for voter 2
it is the universal relation). Figure 2 depicts that profile model, the strategic game matrix
with conditional preferences and winners, and the strategic game matrix with payoffs.
Conditional profiles are pairs (ij, k) where i is 1’s vote in t and j is 1’s vote in u, and k is
2’s vote in {t, u}.
As voter 1 has two information sets, the conditional preference for 1 has two conditions,
for each of which a choice between the three candidates (co-)determines the outcome of
the majority vote. There are therefore 9 conditional preferences for voter 1. The matrix
shows the conditional preferences for 1 by the candidate she votes for in t, followed by the
candidate she votes for in u. Conditional preference xy for 1 means that in state t 1 votes
x and in state u 1 votes y. The payoff matrix next to the winners matrix contains triples
ij.k for, in this order: the value of the worst outcome for 1 given t (≻) of that conditional
profile, the value of the outcome for 1 given u (≻′), and the value of the worst outcome for
2 given t, u, his only information set.
For example, for conditional profile (ba, c) we get ba as the entry in the winners matrix
and (10.0) as the entry in the payoff matrix: if 1 votes b and 2 votes c then the tie
(b ≻tie a ≻tie c) makes b win, value 1 for voter 1 and value 1 for voter 2 in ≻; if 1 votes a
and 2 votes c then a wins, value 0 for voter 1 and for voter 2 in ≻′; the worst of 0 and 1 is
0, so the value for voter 2 of this conditional profile is 0.
The equilibria are, maybe, as expected. (We only consider pure strategies.) If the
profile is ≻ then it is still dominant for voter 1 to vote a (if the profile is ≻′, voting for c is
not dominant for voter 1). Because voter 2 is risk averse, (c, c) is no longer an equilibrium
vote in ≻′. As 2 is uncertain whether 1 prefers c over a or a over c, the safer (risk avoiding)
strategy for 2 is now to vote b, even when 1 and 2 both prefer c. Voter 1 knows this as
well.
Voter 2 does not have a dominant preference, because if he assumes that voter 1 always
votes c, the best response is also to vote c and not to vote b. So this is the only case where
voting b is not an equilibrium vote for 2.
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1 2
a c
b b
c a
——2——
1 2
c c
b b
a a
t,≻ u,≻′
1\2 a b c
aa aa bb aa
ab ab bb ab
ac aa bb ac
ba ba bb ba
bb bb bb bb
bc ba bb bc
ca aa bb ca
cb ab bb cb
cc aa bb cc
1\2 a b c
aa 20.0 11.1 20.0
ab 21.0 11.1 21.0
ac 20.0 11.1 21.0
ba 10.0 11.1 10.0
bb 11.1 11.1 11.1
bc 10.0 11.1 12.1
ca 20.0 11.1 00.0
cb 21.0 11.1 01.1
cc 20.0 11.1 02.2
Figure 2: Voter 2 is uncertain whether voter 1 prefers a over c or c over a
Uncertainty between three states We now add further uncertainty to the two-state
profile model where 2 is uncertain between profiles ≻ and≻′. Figure 3 displays two different
ways to do this. In both depicted profile models voter 1 always knows voter 2’s preferences.
We will show that it is not rational for 2 to behave (vote) differently in s and in t, in the
first, but that it is rational for 2 to behave differently in u and in v, in the second.
Figure 3 also gives an overview of the conditional equilibria for both profile models,
including the matrices with winners in order to calculate the payoffs. As it may be confusing
to see three winners but four payoff values let us explain once more the mechanics of
conditional profiles and conditional equilibria. For example, take the t, u, v model, with
conditional profile (ac, bc) that is an equilibrium, where in the winners matrix we find bbc
for that entry, and where in the payoff matrix we find 11.12. Conditional profile (ac, bc) is
the conditional profile such that
• If 1 prefers a (i.e., in state t) then she votes a, and if 1 prefers c (i.e., in states u, v)
then she votes c.
• If 2 is uncertain whether 1 prefers a (i.e., in states t, u) then he votes b, and if 2
knows that 1 prefers c (i.e., in state v) then he votes c.
The winners in states t, u, v of these conditional preferences are, respectively, b, b, c. If the
state is t, then 1 votes a and 2 votes b, so b wins. If u, then 1 votes c and 2 votes b, so b
wins. If v, then 1 votes c and 2 votes c, so c wins.
The payoff entry is 11.12 because: for voter 1 in state t, the worst (and only) outcome
is b with value 1, for voter 1 in states u, v the worst of b and c, with values 1 and 2, is
(also) 1; for voter 2 in states t, u the worst of b and b, both with value 1, is 1, and for voter
2 the worst and only outcome in state v is c with value 2.
Conditional profile (ac, bc) is an equilibrium. For this, we have to check four virtual
voters. For example, voter 1 in state t cannot do better, because the first digit of the payoff
entries for profiles (bc, bc), (cc, bc) is not greater than 1; voter 1 in class {u, v} cannot do
better: we check the second digit of the entries for conditional profiles (aa, bc) and (ab, bc).
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1 2
a c
b b
c a
——1——
1 2
a c
b b
c a
——2——
1 2
c c
b b
a a
s,≻ t,≻ u,≻′
1\2 aa ab ac ba bb bc ca cb cc
aa aaa abb aaa baa bbb baa aaa abb aaa
ab aab abb aab bab bbb bab aab abb aab
ac aaa abb aac baa bbb bac aaa abb aac
ba bba bbb bba bba bbb bba bba bbb bba
bb bbb bbb bbb bbb bbb bbb bbb bbb bbb
bc bba bbb bbc bba bbb bbc bba bbb bbc
ca aaa abb aca baa bbb bca caa cbb cca
cb aab abb acb bab bbb bcb cab cbb ccb
cc aaa abb acc baa bbb bcc caa cbb ccc
1\2 aa ab ac ba bb bc ca cb cc
aa 20.00 11.01 20.00 10.10 11.11 10.10 20.00 11.01 20.00
ab 21.00 11.01 21.00 11.10 11.11 11.10 21.00 11.01 21.00
ac 20.00 11.01 22.00 10.10 11.11 12.10 20.00 11.01 22.00
ba 10.10 11.11 10.10 10.10 11.11 10.10 10.10 11.11 10.10
bb 11.11 11.11 11.11 11.11 11.11 11.11 11.11 11.11 11.11
bc 10.10 11.11 12.11 10.10 11.11 12.11 10.10 11.11 12.11
ca 20.00 11.01 00.00 10.10 11.11 10.10 00.20 01.21 00.20
cb 21.00 11.01 01.01 11.10 11.11 01.11 01.20 01.21 01.21
cc 20.00 11.01 02.02 10.10 11.11 02.12 00.20 01.21 02.22
1 2
a c
b b
c a
——2——
1 2
c c
b b
a a
——1——
1 2
c c
b b
a a
t,≻ u,≻′ v,≻′
1\2 aa ab ac ba bb bc ca cb cc
aa aaa aab aaa bba bbb bba aaa aab aaa
ab abb abb abb bbb bbb bbb abb abb abb
ac aaa aab aac bba bbb bbc aca acb acc
ba baa bab baa bba bbb bba baa bab baa
bb bbb bbb bbb bbb bbb bbb bbb bbb bbb
bc baa bab bac bba bbb bbc bca bcb bcc
ca aaa aab aaa bba bbb bba caa cab caa
cb abb abb abb bbb bbb bbb cbb cbb cbb
cc aaa aab aac bba bbb bbc cca ccb ccc
1\2 aa ab ac ba bb bc ca cb cc
aa 20.00 20.01 20.00 10.10 11.11 10.10 20.00 20.01 20.00
ab 21.01 21.01 21.01 11.11 11.11 11.11 21.01 21.01 21.01
ac 20.00 20.01 20.02 10.10 11.11 11.12 20.00 21.01 22.02
ba 10.00 10.01 10.00 10.10 11.11 10.10 10.00 10.01 10.00
bb 11.11 11.11 11.11 11.11 11.11 11.11 11.11 11.11 11.11
bc 10.00 10.01 10.02 10.10 11.11 11.12 10.10 11.11 12.12
ca 20.00 20.01 20.00 10.10 11.11 10.10 00.00 00.01 00.00
cb 21.01 21.01 21.01 11.11 11.11 11.11 01.11 01.11 01.11
cc 20.00 20.01 20.02 10.10 11.11 11.12 00.20 01.21 02.22
Figure 3: Conditional equilibria for profile models where two states have the same profile
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Voter 2 cannot do better in t, u, check the third digit in entries for (ac, ac) and (ac, cc); and
voter 2 also cannot do better in v, in which case we check the fourth digit in the entries
for (ac, ba) and (ac, bb). We are done.
In the s, t, u case, it does not make a difference to voter 2 whether he knows voter
1’s preferences. If the profile is ≻, voter 1 knows that voting for a is dominant. On that
assumption, voter 2 should vote b, such that b wins. Indeed, in almost all equilibria (except
(bc, bc)), b wins and the payoff is 1 for both voters. Unlike for the two-state example, where
in all equilibria voter 2 votes b, there are now equilibria wherein voter 2 does not vote b.
However, these are not really interesting, as 1 votes b in these, which is dominated by 1
voting a.
On the other hand, in the t, u, v case, it makes a difference to voter 2 if 1 is uncertain or
not. There are equilibria wherein both players vote c in state v, namely (ac, bc) and (bc, bc).
Whereas there is no equilibrium wherein both players vote c in state u, even though that
would have been just as much in their interest. We can easily justify this result by our
intuitions. If voter 2 is uncertain about 1’s preferences, the worst-case avoiding strategy
remains voting b. If voter 2 knows that 1’s preferences are his own, even 1’s uncertainty is
not enough to make him change his vote. The same cannot be said for voter 1 in that state
v, she has to weigh the odds against voter 2 playing safe and voting b instead; but either
way, voting c then also gives her best result. So voter 1 should be indifferent between b
and c when arguing from that worst-case scenario, and this is indeed the case: (ab, bc) and
(bb, bc) are also equilibria.
6 Revealing voting preferences
We can extend the setting for the interaction of voting preferences and knowledge of the
previous sections with operations wherein voters are informed of other’s preferences, thus
reducing (‘updating’) their uncertainty. An obvious choice for such updates is the public
announcement (Plaza, 1989) of propositions about profiles. A public announcement can
be modelled as an operation Ms 7→ (M|T )s, where T ⊆ S is the denotation in M of a
proposition about profiles ϕ, and M|T means model restriction to subdomain T . In that
case we also write (M|ϕ)s.
Given a knowledge profile Ms, the precondition for execution of the operation public
announcement of ϕ (or update with ϕ) is that ϕ is true in Ms, and the way to execute it
is to restrict the model M to all the states where ϕ is true. We can then investigate the
truth of propositions about profiles in that model restriction. This allows us to evaluate
propositions about profiles of shape ‘after update with ϕ, ψ (is true),’ such as: ‘After voter
1 reveals her preference, voter 2 knows that he has a manipulation’.
All this is embodied in the following definition (see Section 7 for a formal version).
Definition 15 (Updated knowledge profile) Let Ms be a knowledge profile, where
M = (S,∼, pi), and let ϕ be a proposition about profiles with denotation S ′ ⊆ S and such
that s ∈ S ′. Then the updated knowledge profile (M|ϕ)s is defined as M|ϕ = (S ′,∼′, pi′)
where ∼′i = ∼i ∩ (S
′ × S ′) and for all ≻ ∈ O(C)N , pi′(≻) = pi(≻) ∩ S ′.
15
Let ψ also be a proposition about profiles. In Ms it is true that ψ after update with ϕ,
iff whenever ϕ is true in Ms, ψ is true in (M|ϕ)s.
A public announcement is considered information coming from an outside source (for
example, a central authority) and that is reliable. However, it is common in dynamic
epistemic logic to model a public announcement ϕ by an agent a (an inside source, so to
speak, that is modelled in the system) as the public announcement of Kaϕ. This makes it
possible to formalize that a voter reveals her preference to the other voters, as above. But
given this identification, a voter revealing her preferences to me is indistinguishable in the
logical analysis from someone else revealing to me that voter’s preferences. Yet another
situation is when a voter reveals her preferences only to another voter but not to all voters.
This is not a public announcement but a private announcement. Formalizing this is quite
doable but requires a more complex analysis. Finally, announcements can be insincere, or
lies. This also requires a more complex dynamic epistemic analysis.
We proceed with some results. Clearly, manipulations and equilibrium profiles are
preserved after update, as these only depend on the profile of the actual state, that is
preserved after any (truthful) update. These are not epistemic notions. For those, we have
that:
Proposition 16 Knowledge of manipulation is preserved after update.
Proof In any state of the information set of the voter knowing the manipulation, the
profile of that state has a manipulation, by Def. 8. This is a universal property that is
preserved after update. This holds for de re as well as de dicto knowledge. 
Proposition 17 Dominant manipulation is not preserved after update.
Proof This is an existential property that may not be preserved, namely if the (existential)
strictness requirement is only satisfied in states that are removed in the update. 
To investigate how conditional equilibria evolve after updates we first define the update of
a conditional profile.
Definition 18 (Updated conditional profile) Let profile model M = (S,∼, pi) and
conditional profile [≻] be given, where [≻]i : S\∼i → O(C) are conditional preferences.
Let ϕ be a proposition about profiles such that M|ϕ = (S ′,∼′, pi′). Then the updated con-
ditional profile [≻′] (w.r.t. M|ϕ) consists of conditional preferences [≻′]i : S
′\∼′i → O(C)
defined as: for all s ∈ S ′, [≻′]i([s]∼′
i
) = [≻]i([s]∼i).
A preference [≻]i : S\∼i → O(C) may be affected in three different ways in an update:
• An information set for voter i disappears, namely if none of its states satisfies the
update ϕ. The updated preference then has one less condition (the virtual voter
(i, [s]∼i) ceases to exist).
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• An information set for voter i shrinks, because some states satisfy ϕ and others
do not satisfy ϕ. We then have that [s]∼′
i
⊂ [s]∼i . This may affect the value for
i of preference ≻i: states with minimal value may have been removed, namely if
mini F (pi([s]∼i)) ≺i mini F (pi
′([s]∼′
i
)).
• An information set for i remains the same, because all of its states satisfy ϕ. The
expected worst outcome for i remains the same.
Proposition 19 Conditional equilibrium is not preserved after update.
Proof An information update may affect an equilibrium as follows. The outcome for a
virtual voter (i, [s]∼i) casting vote ≻i in the equilibrium is the worst outcome (winner)
for voter i in information set [s]∼i . This payoff value of that winner is at least as good
as the worst outcome in information set [s]∼i for any other preference ≻
′′
i . This is fragile
and not preserved after update. More precisely, we may have that (we recall that for all
≻′ ∈ pi([s]∼i), ≻
′
i = ≻i):
mini F (pi([s]∼i)) i mini F (pi([s]∼i)−i,≻
′′
i )
whereas mini F (pi
′([s]∼′
i
)) ≺i mini F (pi′([s]∼′
i
)−i,≻′′i )
where as before pi′ and ∼′i are the valuation and accessibility relation in the updated profile
model; and this requires a ≻′ ∈ pi([s]∼i\[s]∼′i) such that:
F (≻′) ≻i F (≻′−i,≻
′′
i )

Proposition 20 (Not being a conditional equilibrium) is not preserved after update.
Proof This requires a preference ≻′′i for which mini F (pi([s]∼i) ≺i mini F (pi([s]∼i)−i,≻
′′
i )
and mini F (pi
′([s]∼′
i
)) i mini F (pi′([s]∼′
i
)−i,≻′′i ). 
So conditional equilibria can both disappear and appear after updates (see also Example
21 below). It is unclear to us if there are general patterns here. However, additional
strategic behaviour comes into the picture with these negative results. An update may
consist of a voter revealing her voting preferences. It may be that this voter’s sincere
preference is not part of an equilibrium conditional profile, but that after this voter reveals
her sincere preference, the updated conditional profile is an equilibrium. This interaction
between strategic voting and strategic communication may be of interest.
Example 21 We recall the two-state profile model presented in Section 5.2 and displayed
again below. We now add dynamics to this example: voter 1 informs voter 2 of her true
preference. This is also displayed below.
1 2
a c
b b
c a
⇐
1 2
a c
b b
c a
——2——
1 2
c c
b b
a a
⇒
1 2
c c
b b
a a
t,≻ t,≻ u,≻′ u,≻′
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In state t, after voter 1 informs voter 2 of her true preference a ≻1 c, no uncertainty
remains, and 1 and 2 commonly know that the profile is ≻. From Section 5.2 we further
recall that equilibrium votes for ≻ are (a, b), (b, b), and that conditional equilibria for the
t, u profile model have shape (xy, b), where x is voter 1’s preference in t and y is voter 1’s
preference in u, and where all but cc are equilibria. (See the payoff matrix in Figure 2.)
We can now observe that all conditional equilibria are preserved after update. For
example, given conditional profile (bc, b), the updated conditional profile according to Def. 15
is (b, b). There is therefore no strategic incentive for voter 1 to inform voter 2 in state t.
On the other hand, in state u voter 1 has an incentive to make her preference c ≻1 a
known to 2. In the model with ≻ and ≻′, there is no equilibrium wherein 2 votes c. But after
1 informs 2 that her preferences are the same as his preferences, (c, c) is an equilibrium.
Most conditional equilibria of the two-state model are preserved, but not those where 1
votes c. For example, (ac, b) was an equilibrium, but the updated profile (c, b) is not an
equilibrium.
Voter 1 has a strategic interest to reveal her preferences to voter 2 in state u because
subsequently she expects the outcome of the vote to be better. Before the update she expected
b to win, after update she expects c to win, and c ≻1 b. This demonstrates that:
When there is uncertainty about votes, voters have different ways of acting
strategically: voting strategically or strategically revealing voting preferences.
7 A logic of knowledge and voting
Given the set N of agents, the set of profiles O(C)N , that serve as propositional variables,
and a voting rule F , we now define a logical language and semantics.
Definition 22 (Logical language) The language L is defined as
ϕ ::= ≻ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Kiϕ | [ϕ]ϕ
where i ∈ N and ≻ ∈ O(C)N .
An element of the language is a formula, and ϕ is a formula variable; Kiϕ stands for ‘voter
i knows that ϕ’; [ϕ]ψ stands for ‘after (public) announcement of ϕ, ψ (is true)’.
Definition 23 (Semantics) Let Ms be a knowledge profile, where M = (S,∼, pi).The
interpretation of formulas in a knowledge profile is defined as follows:
Ms |= ≻ iff pi(s) = ≻
Ms |= ¬ϕ iff Ms 6|= ϕ
Ms |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff Ms |= ϕ and Ms |= ψ
Ms |= Kiϕ iff for every t such that s ∼i t,Mt |= ϕ
Ms |= [ϕ]ψ iff Ms |= ϕ implies (M|ϕ)s |= ψ
18
where Ms 6|= ϕ stands for ‘not (Ms |= ϕ)’, and where M|ϕ = (S ′,∼′, pi′) such that
S ′ = {t ∈ S | Mt |= ϕ}, ∼′i = ∼i ∩ (S
′ × S ′), and for all s ∈ S ′, pi′(s) = pi(s). If Ms |= ϕ
for all s ∈ S, we write M |= ϕ (ϕ is valid on M) and if this is the case for all M, we say
that ϕ is valid, and we write |= ϕ. The logic of knowledge and voting is the set of validities
for the class of profile models.
Although the voting function F is not used in the syntax or in the semantics, it will later
be used in the logical abbreviations introduced to formalize concepts such as conditional
equilibrium.
Profile models are standard Kripke models, but with valuations that satisfy special
conditions. We now present principles that are valid on the class of profile models, and
that will feature as axioms in the proof system. Let
∨
denote exclusive disjunction.
P :
∨
O(C)N
N :
∧
i∈N
∧
≻i∈O(C)
(≻i → Ki≻i)
Axiom P spells out that only one profile is true in each state. Axiom N says that voters
know their own preferences.
Proposition 24 The axioms Pand N are valid on the class of profile models.
Proof Axiom P is valid as the valuation pi is a function from states to profiles. Axiom N
formalizes the constraint on knowledge profiles that s ∼i t implies pi(s)i = pi(t)i. 
Proposition 25 The logic of knowledge and voting has a complete axiomatization.
Proof As the axiomatization of the logic of knowledge and voting we propose the ax-
iomatization of public announcement logic, that is standard and that we assume to be
known (Plaza, 1989), and to which we add the axioms P and N. This axiomatization
is with respect to the class of profile models (see the definition of the logic, above). For
the soundness we refer to the soundness of public announcement logic and the validity
of P and N (Prop. 24). For the completeness we observe that the canonical model to
determine the completeness of the logic without public announcements is a profile model
(Prop. 24, again), and that the completeness of the logic with announcements is as usual
(see van Ditmarsch et al. (2008)) obtained because every formula is equivalent to one with-
out announcements (the axioms are rewriting rules, pushing all logical connectives beyond
announcements, such as [ϕ](ψ ∧ χ)↔ ([ϕ]ψ ∧ [ϕ]χ)). 
We proceed to formalize the concepts involving knowledge and voting. The main defi-
nition of interest is that of conditional equilibrium. We start with some abbreviations.3
≻i :=
∨
{≻′ ∈ O(C)N | ≻i = ≻′i}
a ≻i b :=
∨
{≻′ ∈ O(C)N | a ≻′i b}
a :=
∨
{≻ ∈ O(C)N | F (≻) = a}
(≻−i,≻′i) :=
∨
{≻′′ ∈ O(C)N | (≻−i,≻′i) = ≻
′′}
F (≻′) ≻i F (≻′′) := ((≻′ → a) ∧ (≻′′ → b))→ (a ≻i b)
3In the 4th abbreviation, note that the ≻′′ such that (≻−i,≻′i) = ≻
′′ is unique, and that
∨
{≻′′} = ≻′′.
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We emphasize the role of the background parameter F in these abbreviations. Firstly, the
‘formula’ a above (third item) stands for ‘candidate a wins the election’. The definiens
uses F . Formula a is therefore true in a state s with profile pi(s) such that F (pi(s)) = a.
Secondly, the use of F in the definiendum of the final abbreviation (fifth item), F (≻′) ≻i
F (≻′′), is therefore proper, because the definiens refers to these winners, namely in ≻′ → a
and ≻′′ → b: that a and b are abbreviations of formulas that use F .
Example 26 We demonstrate the logic reusing Example 7 about Leela and Sunil.
• Leela prefers Alice over Cars: Mt |= a ≻1 c
• Sunil does not know that Leela prefers Alice over Cars: Mt |= ¬K2(a ≻1 c)
• Leela knows Sunil’s preference, but Leela is uncertain whether Sunil knows her pref-
erence: Mt |= K1≻2 ∧ ¬(K1K2≻1 ∨K1¬K2≻1)
• Sunil does not know that Leela prefers Alice over Cars, but after he was told so, he
knows it: Mt |= ¬K2(a ≻1 c) ∧ [a ≻1 c]K2(a ≻1 c)
Using the above abbreviations and trivial ones like a i b := ¬(b ≻i a) we now have that:
• Voter i has a manipulation of profile ≻:∨
≻′
i
∈O(C)(F (≻−i,≻
′
i) ≻i F (≻))
• Voter i has a manipulation ≻′i in profile ≻:
F (≻−i,≻′i) ≻i F (≻)
• Voter i has a dominant manipulation ≻′i in profile ≻:∧
≻′′∈O(C)N (F (≻
′′
−i,≻
′
i) i F (≻
′′)) ∧
∨
≻′′∈O(C)N (F (≻
′′
−i,≻
′
i) ≻i F (≻
′′))
• Voter i with preference ≻i knows de dicto that she has a manipulation:
Ki
∨
≻′
i
∈O(C)(≻
′′ → (F (≻′′−i,≻
′
i) ≻i F (≻
′′)))
• Voter i with preference ≻i knows de re that she has a manipulation:∨
≻′
i
∈O(C)Ki(≻
′′ → (F (≻′′−i,≻
′
i) ≻i F (≻
′′)))
• Profile ≻ is an equilibrium profile:∧
i∈N
∧
≻′
i
∈O(C)(F (≻) i F (≻−i,≻
′
i))
• A conditional equilibrium (where J is defined below):
∧
J

(∧
i∈N
ϕ
j(i)
i )→
∧
k∈N
∧
≻′
k
∈O(C)
(
F (
∧
i∈N
≻j(i)i ) 
j(i)
k F ( (
∧
i∈N
≻j(i)i )−k,≻
′
k )
)

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In the formalization of knowledge de re and de dicto, condition ‘≻′′ →’ guarantees that
only profiles ≻′′ in the information set pi([t]∼i) of a knowledge profile Mt are selected.
The index set J in the definition of conditional equilibrium ranges over distinguishing
formulas ϕ
j(i)
i for all (n) voters and for all information sets of those voters, i.e., J :=
{(j(1), . . . , j(n)) | 1 ≤ j(1) ≤ max(1), . . . , 1 ≤ j(n) ≤ max(n)} where each voter i has
max(i) information sets; and where for condition ϕ
j(i)
i voter i has preference ≻
j(i)
i . A
distinguishing formula is only true in that information set of the voter and else false. As the
domain is finite, such distinguishing formulas exist. The distinguishing formulas cover the
profile model, i.e., let the information sets for a voter in a given profile model be numbered
1, . . . ,max, then there are formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕmax such that
∨
j=1...max ϕ
j and
∧
j=1...max(ϕ
j →
¬ϕj+1) (where max+1 = 1) are valid on the profile model. The formalization of conditional
equilibrium then simply spells out the equilibrium for the Bayesian game with virtual agents
(‘virtual voters’) (i, [s]∼i) instead of voters i. Note that
∧
i∈N ≻
j(i)
i represents a profile: a
validity of the logic is that ≻ ↔
∧
i∈N ≻i.
8 Conclusion and further research
We presented a logic for the interaction of voting and knowledge. The semantic primitive is
the knowledge profile: a profile including uncertainty of voters about the profile. We defined
de re knowledge of manipulation and de dicto knowledge of manipulation, and the notion
of conditional equilibrium for risk-averse voters. We modelled the dynamics of knowledge,
such as voters revealing preferences, and its effects on knowledge of manipulation and
on conditional equilibrium, where we proved that knowledge of manipulation is preserved
after such updates whereas a conditional equilibrium may not be preserved. Finally, we
formalized the system in a dynamic epistemic logic.
Our goal was to present a minimally meaningful extension of works on uncertainty in
voting, namely that permits formalizing higher-order uncertainty and updates of uncer-
tainty. Many further extensions are conceivable.
Additionally to uncertainty over the preferences of other voters one can consider uncer-
tainty over the voting function. Instead of profile models consisting of states with a profile
for each such state, we would then need ‘voting models’ consisting of states with a profile
and a voting function for each state. Notions like pessimistic manipulation, conditional
preference, and conditional equilibrium generalize straightforwardly to this setting. The
logic would need an additional axiom to describe that only one voting function can be
associated with a given state.
Apart from voters 1, . . . , n it is convenient to distinguish a designated additional agent
0 who is the central authority, or chair. The universal relation on a knowledge profile
model can then be seen as the indistinguishability relation of that agent 0. This opens the
door to the logical modelling of well-studied problems in computational social choice, such
as control by the chair, or determining possible winners.
Our results are for any amount of voters but all our examples were for at most three
voters. This was for the purpose of presentation. Still, in realistic settings the power of
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individual voters is very limited. However, our results seem also to meaningfully apply to
(few) coalitions of voters. In voting theory, the power of a coalition means the power of a
set of agents that can decide on a joint action as a result of communication between them.
Under conditions of uncertainty about profiles this is therefore a function of the distributed
knowledge of that coalition. In a knowledge profile, the indistinguishability relation for a
coalition is the intersection of the indistinguishability relations for the individuals in the
coalition.
We modelled knowledge of preferences, not belief. Unlike knowledge, beliefs may be
incorrect. Somewhat similarly, unlike truthful announcements, insincere announcements
(e.g., lying about your true preferences in a voting poll) may lead to false beliefs. Con-
ceptually, the interaction between belief and voting is much more complex than between
knowledge and voting. Technically, there may be fewer issues, for example, the same logic
as in Section 7 can be used with minor adjustments.
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